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Multireceiver authentication codes allow one sender to construct an
authenticated message for a group of receivers such that each receiver
can verify authenticity of the received message. In this paper, we give a
formal definition of multireceiver authentication codes, derive information
theoretic and combinatorial lower bounds on their performance, and give
new efficient and flexible constructions for such codes. Finally, we extend
the basic model to the case that multiple messages are sent and the case
that the sender can be any member of the group. ] 1999 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
Multireceiver authentication codes (MRA-codes) are introduced by Desmedt,
Frankel, and Yung (DFY) [6] as an extension of Simmons’ model of unconditio-
nally secure authentication [18]. In an MRA-code, a sender wants to authenticate
a message for a group of receivers such that each receiver can verify authenticity
of the received message. The receivers are not trusted and may try to construct
fraudulent messages on behalf of the transmitter. If the fraudulent message is
acceptable by even one receiver the attackers have succeeded. This is a useful exten-
sion of traditional authentication codes and has numerous applications. For example,
a director wanting to give instructions to employees in an organisation such that
each employee is able to verify authenticity of the message. Providing such service
using a digital signature implies that security is based on unproven assumptions
and the attackers have a finite amount of computational resources. In this paper,
we will be only concerned with the unconditionally secure model, that is, there are
no computational assumptions or limitations on the attackers’ resources.
A multireceiver A-code can be trivially constructed using traditional A-codes: the
sender shares a common key with each receiver and to send an authenticated
message, he constructs n codewords, one for each receiver, concatenates them, and
broadcasts the result. Now each receiver can verify its own codeword and so
authenticate the message. In this construction collaboration of even n&1 receivers
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does not enable them to construct a message that is acceptable by the n th receiver
simply because the n codewords are independently constructed. If we assume that
the size of the malicious groups cannot be too large, for example the biggest num-
ber of collaborators is w&1 (w<n), then we can expect to save on the size of the
key and the length of the codeword because codewords can have dependencies. This
is the basic motivation of studying MRA-codes that are more efficient than the tri-
vial one described above. DFY gave two constructions for (w, n) MRA-codes based
on polynomials over finite fields and finite geometries. DFY description of
MRA-code is basically an operational description of the system, that is the way the
system works. Kurosawa and Obana (KO) [13] studied (w, n) MRA-code, again
using the operational description of these codes, derived combinatorial lower
bounds on the probability of success in impersonation and substitution attacks, and
characterised Cartesian MRA-codes that satisfy the bound with equality. They
showed that DFY polynomial construction is in fact an optimal (smallest sizes of
transmitter and receiver keys) construction.
In this paper we start by giving a formal definition of an MRA-code and use it
to derive information-theoretic bounds on the probability of success in impersona-
tion and substitution attack against a single receiver for a general MRA-code.
These bounds are used to obtain lower bounds on the the number of keys of trans-
mitter and receivers, and also lower bound on the length of the transmitted
codeword in terms of deception probability of the system. This is followed by a
review of the known constructions of MRA-codes, pointing out their shortcomings
and giving constructions that alleviate these shortcomings. Finally we discuss two
extensions of MRA-codes, codes for multiple message transmissions, and codes with
dynamic senders, and give constructions for each. In the concluding section we
propose possible extensions for this work.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides basic definitions and
reviews known results. In Section 3 we define MRA-codes and derive information-
theoretic and combinatorial bounds. In Section 4 we first review DFY polynomial
construction and then propose a more flexible construction by combining an
arbitrary A-code with a cover-free family. In Section 5 we consider two generalisa-
tions of our basic system and give an efficient construction for each. Finally in
ection 6 we summarise our results and discuss open problems. Results presented in
this paper were in part presented at Eurocrypt ’98.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In Simmons’ model of unconditionally secure authentication there are three par-
ticipants: a transmitter (sender), a receiver, and an opponent. The transmitter and
the receiver share a secret key and are both assumed honest. The message is sent
over a public channel which is subject to active attack. Transmitter and receiver use
an authentication code which is a set of authentication functions f, indexed by a key
belonging to a set E. To authenticate a message called a source state and denoted
by s # S, using a key e, transmitter forms a codeword f (e, s) from a set M and sends
it to the receiver who can verify its authenticity using his knowledge of the key.
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Definition 2.1. An authentication code C is a 4-tuple (S, M, E, f ), where f is
a mapping from S_E to M,
f : S_E  M
such that f (s, e)=m and f (s$, e)=m imply s=s$.
In a systematic Cartesian A-code the codeword corresponding to a source state
s using e # E is the concatenation of s and an authentication tag t # T; that is
m=(s, t). The receiver will detect a fraudulent codeword (s, t) if the tag that he
calculates for s using his secret key e is different from the received tag t.
The opponent can perform an impersonation, or a substitution, attack by con-
structing a fraudulent codeword and succeeds if the codeword is accepted by the
receiver. In impersonation the attacker has not seen any previous communication
while in substitution he has seen one transmitted codeword. A code provides perfect
protection against impersonation if the enemy’s best strategy is randomly guessing
a codeword. In the case of Cartesian A-codes, the enemy’s probability of success is
PI=1 |T| . Perfect protection for substitution is defined in a similar way and
requires the enemy’s best strategy to randomly select one of the remaining codewords
such that the source state is different from the observed one. For Cartesian A-codes
the probability of success of the intruder is PS=1 |T| .
An extension of this model, proposed by Desmedt, Frankel and Yung (DFY)
[6], is when there are multiple receivers. The system works as follows. First the key
distribution centre (KDC) distributes secret keys to the transmitter and each
receiver. Next the transmitter broadcasts a message to all the receivers who can
individually verify authenticity of the message using their secret key information.
There are malicious groups of receivers who use their secret keys and all the pre-
vious communications in the system to construct fraudulent messages. They succeed
in their attack even if a single receiver accepts the message as being authentic.
KO formalisation of (w, n) MRA-codes is as follows. Let E1 , E2 , .., En denote the
set of decoding rules of receivers R1 , ..., Rn , and S and M denote the set of source
states and sender codewords, respectively. We will also use X to denote a random
variable defined on a set X.
Definition 2.2 [13]. We say that (S, M, E1 , ..., En) is a (w, n) multireceiver
A-code if for \(Ei1 , ..., Eiw) and \(e1 , ..., ew),
P(Eiw=ew | Ei1=e1 , ..., Eiw&1=ew&1)=P(Eiw=ew).
Probabilities of success in impersonation and substitution attacks, PI and PS , for
(w, n) MRA-codes are then defined as
PI=max
Ri
max
m
P(Ri accepts m)
PS=:
m
P(m) max
Ri
max
m$
P(Ri accepts m$ | R i accepts m),
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where maximum is taken over m$ such that the source state of m$ is different from
that of m. With these definitions, they derived the following bounds. Assume
l=|M ||S|.
Theorem 2.1 (Theorem 9 in [13]). In a (w, n) MRA-code, PI1 w- l. Equality
holds if and only if P(Ri1 , ..., Riw accept m)=1l and P(Rj accepts m)=1
w- l for
any m and any Rj .
Theorem 2.2 (Theorem 10 in [13]). In a (w, n) MRA-code without secrecy, if
PI=1 w- l, then PS1 w- l. Equality holds if and only if
P(Ri1 , ..., Rik accept m$ | Ri1 , ..., Rik accept m)=1l
P(Rj accepts m$ | Rj accepts m)=1 w- l
\Rj , \m, and \m$ such that the source state of m is different from that of m$.
Theorem 2.5 (Theorem 11 in [13]). In a (w, n) MRA-code without secrecy, if
PI=PS=1 w- l, then |Ej |( w- l)2 \j. If equality holds, then each rule of Ej is used
with equal probability.
KO characterised Cartesian MRA-codes that satisfy PI=PS=1 w- l and observed
that DFY polynomial construction is in fact an optimal construction and has the
least number of keys for the transmitter and the receivers and requires the smallest
size for the authenticator.
Definition 2.2 does not specify the relationship between the encoding functions of
the transmitter and the receivers and only requires the independence of receivers’
keys for any set of w receivers. This independence, as shown in Lemma 3.1, is suf-
ficient to ensure that the probability of success in impersonation attack by any w&1
receivers against another receiver is the same as that by an (outside) opponent.
We give a general definition of MRA-codes in terms of commutative mappings,
and for (w, n) MRA-codes we only require the success probability of attackers
in impersonation andor substitution attacks to be less than one. However, we do
allow coalition of insiders to have a higher chance of success, compared to an out-
sider. KO’s definition of (w, n) MRA-codes corresponds to our definition of (w, n)
MRA-codes that are perfect for impersonation (see Lemma 3.1).
3. MODEL AND BOUNDS
An MRA-system has three phases:
1. Key distribution. The KDC (key distribution centre) privately transmits
the key information to the sender and each receiver (the sender can also be the
KDC).
2. Broadcast. For a source state, the sender generates the authenticated
message using hisher key and broadcasts the authenticated message.
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3. Verification. Each user can verify the authenticity of the broadcast
message.
Denote by X1_ } } } _Xn the direct product of sets X1 , ..., Xn , and by pi the pro-
jection mapping of X1 _ } } } _Xn on Xi . That is, pi : X1 _ } } } _Xn  Xi defined by
pi (x1 , x2 , ..., xn)=x i . Let g1 : X1  Y1 and g2 : X2  Y2 be two mappings, we denote
the direct product of g1 and g2 by g1_g2 , where g1 _g2 : X1 _X2  Y1_Y2 is
defined by (g1_g2)(x1 , x2)=(g1 (x1), g2 (x2)). The identity mapping on a set X is
denoted by 1X .
Definition 3.1. Let C=(S, M, E, f ) and Ci=(S, Mi , Ei , fi), i=1, 2, ..., n, be
authentication codes. We call (C; C1 , C2 , ..., Cn) a multireceiver authentication code
(MRA-code) if there exist two mappings {: E  E1_ } } } _En and ?: M 
M1_ } } } _Mn such that for any (s, e) # S_E and any 1in, the following
identity holds
pi (?f (s, e))= f i ((1S _pi{)(s, e)).
Let {i= pi { and ?i= pi?. Then we have for each (s, e) # S_E
?i f (s, e)= fi (1S_{i)(s, e).
We assume that for each i the mappings {i : E  Ei and ?i : M  Mi are surjective.
We also assume that for each code Ci the probability distribution on the source
states of Ci is the same as that in the A-code C, and the probability distribution on
Ei is derived from that of E and the mapping {i .
Let T denote the sender and R1 , ..., Rn denote the n receivers. In order to authen-
ticate a message, the sender and receivers follow the following protocol.
1. The KDC (or the sender) randomly chooses a key e # E and privately
transmits e to T and ei=?i (e) to the receiver Ri , 1in.
2. If T wants to send a source state s # S to all the receivers, T computes
m= f (s, e) # M and broadcasts it to all receivers.
3. Receiver Ri checks whether a source state s such that f i (s, ei)=?i (m)
exists. If such an s exists, the message m is accepted as authentic. Otherwise m is
rejected.
We adopt Kerckhoff ’s principle that everything in the system except the actual
keys of the sender and receivers is public. This includes the probability distribution
of the source states and the sender’s keys. From Definition 3.1 we know that the
probability distribution of the sender’s key induces a probability distribution on
each receiver’s key.
Attackers could be outsiders who do not have access to any key information, or
insiders who have some key information. We only need to consider the latter group
as it is at least as powerful as the former. We consider the systems that protect
against the coalition of groups of up to a maximum size of receivers, and we study
impersonation and substitution attacks.
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Assume there are n receivers R1 , ..., Rn . Let L=[i1 , ..., il][1, ..., n], EL=
Ei1 _ } } } _Eil and RL=[Ri1 , ..., Ril]. We consider the attack from RL on a receiver
Ri , where i  L.
Impersonation attack. RL , after receiving their secret keys, send a message m to
Ri . RL is successful if m is accepted by Ri as authentic. We denote by PI [i, L] the
success probability of RL in performing an impersonation attack on Ri . This can be
expressed as
PI[i, L]= max
eL # EL
max
m # M
P(m is accepted by Ri | eL), (1)
where i  L.
Substitution attack. RL , after observing a message m that is transmitted by the
sender, replace m with another message m$. RL is successful if m$ is accepted by Ri
as authentic. We denote by PS [i, L], the success probability of RL in performing
a substitution attack on Ri . We have
PS [i, L]= max
eL # EL
max
m # M
max
m${m # M
P(Ri accepts m$ | m, eL). (2)
The following two bounds are generalisations of Simmons’ bound [18] and
Brickell’s bound [4], when the attack is from a group of insiders who have access
to part of the key information.
Theorem 3.2. Let PI [i, L] and PS [i, L] be defined as in Eqs. (1) and (2).
Assume that M${M; then
1. PI[i, L]2&I(M; Ei | EL).
2. PS [i, L]2&I(M$; Ei | M, EL).
Proof is given in the Appendix I.
Corollary 3.1.
PS [i, L]2&H(Ei | M, EL).
Proof. The corollary follows from Theorem 3.3 by noting that I(M$; Ei | M, EL)
=H(Ei | M, EL)&H(Ei | M$, M, EL). K
A (w, n) MRA-code is an MRA-code in which there are n receivers such that no
subset of w&1 receivers can construct a fraudulent codeword accepted by another
receiver. We note that in this definition, the only requirement is that the chance of
success of the attackers is less than one, but it is possible that some coalition of
attackers can have a better chance of success than an outsider.
A (w, n) MRA-code is perfect for impersonation if the chance of success of any
group of up to w&1 receivers in an impersonation attack is the same as an
outsider. Similarly, a (w, n) MRA-code is perfect for substitution if the chance of
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success for any group of up to w&1 receivers in a substitution attack is the same
as an outsider.
Lemma 3.1. A sufficient condition for a (w, n) MRA-code to be perfect for imper-
sonation is that P(ei | eL)=P(ei) for all w-subsets L _ [i], i  L of [1, ..., n].
Proof. Consider the A-code Ci=(S, Mi , Ei); we define an authentication func-
tion /(mi , ei) on Mi_Si as
/S(m i , ei)={1,0,
if mi is authentic for the key ei ,
otherwise.
We have P(?i (m) is valid in Ci)=ei # Ei /(?i (m), ei) P(ei). By the definition of
/I (m, ei , eL) (see Appendix I), we know that for any given eL , in accordance with
{L (e)=eL and {i=ei , /(? i (m), ei)=/I (m, ei , eL). Thus, we have
PI [i, L]=max
m # M
P(m is accepted by Ri | eL)
=max
m # M
:
ei # Ei
/I (m, ei , eL) P(ei | eL)
=max
m # M
:
ei # Ei
/(? i (m), e i) P(e i | eL)
=PI[i]. K
In the above lemma, PI [i] is the success probability of an outsider in an imper-
sonation attack and is given by
PI[i]=max
m # M
P(Ri accepts m)=max
m # M
P(?i (m) is valid in Ci)
It should also be noted that a (w, n) MRA-code which is perfect for impersonation
is not necessarily perfect for substitution.
Let (C; Ci , ..., Cn) be an MRA-code. Define PI and PS as
PI= max
L _ [i]
[PI [i, L]]
PS= max
L _ [i]
[PS [i, L]],
where the maximum is taken over all possible w-subsets L _ [i] (i  L) of
[1, 2, ..., n]. In other words, PI and PS are the best chance of a group of w&1
receivers to succeed in impersonation or substitution attacks against a single
receiver, respectively. We define the deception probability of a (w, n) MRA-system
as PD=max[PI , PS].
Theorem 3.5. Let (C; C1 , ..., Cn) be a (w, n) MRA-code. Assume that PD1q
and there is a uniform probability distribution on the source states S. Then
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(i) |Ei |q2, for each i # [1, ..., n].
(ii) |E|q2w.
(iii) |M|qw |S|.
The bounds are tight and there exists a system that satisfies the bounds with equality.
Proof. (i) For each (w&1)-subset L of [1, ..., n] and any i # [1, ..., n], where
i  L, by Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 we have
\1q+
2
P2DPI [i, L] PS [i, L]2
&(I(M; Ei | EL)+H(Ei | EL, M))=2&H(Ei | EL)
2&H(Ei)2&log |Ei |=
1
|Ei |
.
It follows that |Ei |q2.
(ii) Assume that Li=[1, ..., i&1, i+1, ..., w], i=1, ..., w. We have
\1q+
2w
 ‘
w
i=1
PI[i, Li] PS [i, Li]2
w
i=1&H(Ei | ELi)
2&
w
i=1 H(Ei | E1, ..., Ei&1)=2&H(E1, ..., Ew)
2&H(E)2&log |E|=
1
|E|
.
Therefore, |E|q2w.
(iii) Since {: E  E1_ } } } _En induces a mapping from E to E1 _ } } } _Ew ,
we have I(M; E)I(M; E1 , ..., Ew). It follows that
2&I(M; E)2&I(M; E1, ..., Ew)=2&
w
i=1 I(M; Ei | E1, ..., Ew)
=2&
w
i=1 I(M; Ei | E1, ..., Ei&1)
= ‘
w
i=1
2&I(M; Ei | E1, ..., Ei&1) ‘
w
i=1
PI [i, Qi],
where Qi = [1, ..., i&1]. Since for each 1iw, we have PI[i, Q i]
PI[i, Li]1q, it follows that
2&I(M; E)=2&(H(M)&H(M | E))=2&H(M)2H(M | E)\1q+
w
.
Since S is assumed to be uniformly distributed, we know that H(M | E)=
H(S)=log |S|. Hence |M|=2log |M|2H(M)qw |S|, which proves (iii).
The bounds are tight as it is easy to verify that they are satisfied by the DFY
polynomial construction. In this construction (briefly recalled in the next section),
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we have PD=1q, |Ei |=q2, for all 1in, |E|=q2w, and |M|=qw |S| and so the
lower bounds are satisfied with equality. K
Comparison of the bounds with KO’s bounds. Theorem 3.3 gives combinatorial
bounds on the size of the transmitter’s and receivers’ key spaces for general (w, n)
MRA-codes with or without secrecy when the probability of deception is known. It
also lower bounds the required redundancy in terms of the deception probabilities.
KO derived a similar set of bounds (Theorems 9, 10, 11 in [13]) which only
apply to (w, n) MRA-codes without secrecy that are perfect for impersonation. In
Appendix II we give a detailed comparison of the two sets of bounds.
4. CONSTRUCTIONS
4.1. DFY Polynomial Construction
In [6], Desmedt, Frankel, and Yung gave two constructions for MRA-codes:
one is based on polynomials and the other based on finite geometries. We briefly
review DFY’s polynomial construction because generalisations of this scheme will
be discussed in later sections of this paper. Details of the geometric construction
can be found in [6].
Assume there is a sender T, and n receivers R1 , ..., Rn . The DFY polynomial
scheme works as follows: The key for T consists of two random polynomials P0 (x)
and P1 (x), each of degree at most w&1, with coefficients in GF(q), where
q>max[ |S|, n]. The key for R i consists of P0 (i) and P1 (i). For a source state
s # GF(q), T broadcasts (s, A(x)), where A(x)=P0 (x)+sP1 (x). Ri accepts (s, A(x))
as authentic if A(i)=P0 (i)+sP1 (i). It is proved [6] that the construction results in
a MRA-code with PD=1q and the following parameters:
|S|=
1
q
, |Ei |=q2, \i # [1, ..., n], |E|=22w, |M|=qw|S|.
Hence the bounds in Theorem 3.2 can be achieved with equality.
A trivial construction for MRA-codes, as mentioned in the Introduction, requires
the sender to store many key bits and produces a long tag for the authenticated
message. The DFY scheme significantly reduces the size of the key storage and the
length of the authentication tag. However, the order of the field GF(q) must be
chosen bigger than the size of the source space and the number of receivers. In fact
q, which can be thought of as the security parameter of the system (PI=PS=1q)
determines the size of the key storage and the length of the authentication tag. This
makes the construction very restrictive because, although it is acceptable to have
the key storage and length of the tag be a function of the security parameter of the
system, having the number of receivers and the size of the source bounded by it, is
not reasonable. In particular when the size of the source or the number of receivers
are very large, PI and PS will be unnecessarily small and the key storage of the
sender and the receivers, together with the length of the authentication tag will
become prohibitively large.
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In practice, we may deal with the scenarios where we are satisfied with deception
probabilities higher than 1q, but have limitation on key storage or communication
bandwidth. So it is desirable to look for constructions that can cater to such trade-
offs. In Section 4.2 we will give a construction that accommodates this situation.
4.2. A Construction Based on (n, m, w)-Cover-Free Family
In this section we present a general construction for (w, n) MRA-codes by
combining an arbitrary A-code with an (n, m, w)-cover-free family.
Definition 4.1. Let X=[x1 , ..., xm] and F=[B1 , ..., Bn] be a family of
subsets of X. We call (X, F) an (n, m, w) cover-free family (CFF) if B0 /%
B1 _ } } } _ Bw&1 for all B0 , B1 , ..., Bw&1 # F, where Bi {Bj if i{ j.
CFFs were introduced by Erdo s et al. in [8, and 9] and further implicitly studied
by Fujii, Kachen, and Kurosawa in [11] in connection with MRA-codes. An
(n, w, 2) CFF is exactly a Sperner family. A trivial CFF is the family consisting of
single element subsets, in which case n=m. Nontrivial CFFs are those with n>m.
A good CFF is one that for given m and w, n is large. Finding good CFFs with the
largest possible n is believed to be a hard combinatorial problem [7]. Construction
of CFFs employs various areas of mathematics such as finite geometry, design
theory, and probability theory and is beyond the scope of this paper.
Assume that (X, F) is an (n, m, w) CFF and (S, T, E, f ) is an A-code without
secrecy. We construct a (w, n) MRA-code as follows:
1. Key distribution. The KDC randomly chooses an m-tuple of keys (e1 , ..., em)
# Em, then privately sends (e1 , ..., em) to the sender T and e i to every receiver Rj for
all j with xi # Bj , 1im.
2. Broadcast. For a source state s # S, the sender calculates ai= f (s, ei) for
all 1im and broadcast (s, a1 , ..., am).
3. Verification. Since the receiver Ri holds the keys [ej | for all j with
xj # Bi], Ri accepts (s, a1 , ..., am) as authentic if for all j satisfying xj # Bi , aj= f (s, ej).
Assume that the probabilities of impersonation and substitution attacks
for the underlying A-code, C, is PI and PS , respectively, and let :=
min[ |B0"B1 _ } } } _ Bw&1 |; for all B0 , ..., Bw&1 # F].
Theorem 4.2. The above scheme is a (w, n) MRA-code and the probabilities of
impersonation and substitution attacks are (PI): and (PS):, respectively.
The proof of the theorem is straightforward. In this scheme the sender is required
to store m Wlog |E|X bits, and the receiver Ri to store |Bi | Wlog |E|X bits. The
authentication tag is of size m Wlog |T|X.
In [11], Fujii, Kachen, and Kurosawa gave a definition of broadcast authentica-
tion which can be seen as a special case of DFY definition of MRA systems. Fujii
et al. also gave a construction for their broadcast authentication system which is a
special case of the above construction, when the cover-free family has constant
block size, that is, |Bi |=c, i=1, ..., n.
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An important property of this construction is that it allows a complex system,
such as a (w, n) MRA-code, to be constructed from two simpler ones, an A-code
and a cover-free family, such that the security of the former can be described in
terms of the properties and parameters of the latter. Another advantage of this con-
struction is its flexibility in choosing system parameters. That is, w and n are deter-
mined by the cover-free family while PI and PS are determined by the A-code and
the cover-free family and so it is possible to fix w and n but change the A-code to
obtain MRA-codes that provide the required protection. The following examples
compare this construction with that of DFY polynomial scheme.
Example 4.1. Assume that the size of the source state is only one bit (for
example, yes and no) and we need a (2, 70) MRA-code with the probabilities of imper-
sonation and substitution attacks not greater than 12. Using DFY polynomial
scheme we need a finite field GF(q) with q70; it follows that Wlog qX7, and so
the sender must store at least 28 bits and each receiver must store at least 14 bits.
The length of the authentication tag is at least 14 bits, and the probabilities of
impersonation and substitution attacks are ( 12)
7. Now we use our construction. It is
easy to see that the Sperner family consisting of all 4-subsets of a set of 8 elements
gives a (70, 8, 2) CFF. We define the underlying A-code C=(S, T, E, f ) as follows.
Let S=T=GF(2), E=GF(2)2, and f: S_E  T be given by f (s, (e, e$))=e+se$.
Then C is an A-code with PI=PS= 12 . Applying our scheme, the sender and each
receiver need to store only 16 bits and 8 bits, respectively. The length of authentica-
tion tag is of 8 bits and the probabilities of impersonation and substitution attacks
are both 12.
Example 4.2. Assume that the size of the source is very large, for example 220
bits (i.e. |S|=2220). A direct computation shows that the DFY polynomial scheme
for (2, 70) MRA-code requires that the sender and each receiver to store 222 and
221 bits, respectively. The length of authentication tag is 221 bits while the probabil-
ity of impersonation and substitution attacks is not greater that 12220. In many
applications the deception probability of around 1220 is an acceptable security
level. Consider an A-code that it is constructed from a universal hashing family (see
[22]) with the following parameter: 220 bits of source state, 445 bits of authentica-
tion key, 20 bits of authentication tag and the probability of impersonation and
substitution attacks is not greater than 1219. Combining with the (70, 8, 2) CFF,
our construction results in a (2, 70) MRA-code in which the key storages for the
sender and each receiver are 3560 bits and 1780 bits, respectively. The length of the
authentication tag is 160 bits and the deception probability is bounded by 1219.
We note that this construction is only suitable for the case when the number of
malicious receivers, compared to the total number of the receivers, is not very large.
This is due to the following result.
Lemma 4.5 [9]. In a nontrivial (n, m, w) CFF, w(w&1)2n.
In [7], using probabilistic methods the authors proved that for small w, there exist
(n, O(log n), w) CFFs. Finally, we point out that in general the constructions based
on CFFs do not provide MRA-codes that are perfect for impersonation or substitution.
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5. GENERALISATIONS
The basic MRA-code can be generalised in a number of ways. In this section we
look at two possible generalisations.
5.1 MRA-Codes for Multiple Message Transmissions
In the basic model of MRA-codes, security analysis is for a single message trans-
mission (only impersonation and substitution attacks are considered) and for a
second message no protection is guaranteed. To provide protection for multiple
message transmission one possibility is to use a new key after each message is
broadcasted. This is a very inefficient solution both in terms of going through a key
distribution phase after each message and the amount of key information required
for each message. In the following section we propose systems that use a single key
distribution phase for multiple message transmission, and compared to using a new
key require less key information per communicated message.
5.1.1. Generalised DFY scheme for multiple messages. Assume messages are all
distinct and t<|S|. The scheme consists of the following steps:
1. Key distribution. The KDC randomly generates t+1 polynomials P0 (x),
P1 (x), ..., Pt (x) of degree at most w&1 and chooses n distinct elements
x1 , x2 , } } } , xn of GF(q). KDC makes x i ’s public and sends privately (P0 (x), P1 (x),
} } } , Pt (x)) to the sender T, and (P0 (x i), P1 (xi), } } } , Pt (x i)) to the receiver Ri .
2. Broadcast. For a source state s, T computes As (x)=P0 (x)+sP1 (x)
+ } } } +stPt (x) and broadcasts (s, As (x)).
3. Verification. Ri accepts (s, As (x)) as authentic if As (xi)=P0 (x i)+
sP1 (xi)+ } } } +stPt (xi).
Theorem 5.1 [17]. The above scheme is a (w, n) MRA-code in which every key
can be used to authenticate up to t messages.
To authenticate t consecutive messages, using basic DFY scheme, 2t polynomials
are required while in the above scheme we only need t+1 polynomials. So the key
storage for the sender and receivers is (t+1)w Wlog qX bits and (w+1)Wlog qX bits,
respectively, and are reduced to around half that of the DFY scheme. The length
of the authentication tag for both constructions is the same and equal to tw Wlog qX
bits.
5.1.2. Using Cover-Free Family Construction. To extend the construction of
Section 4.2 to support multiple messages it is only required to replace the underly-
ing A-code by an A-code that provides protection against spoofing of order t, t>1.
In a spoofing of order t attack on an A-code, the enemy has access to t authen-
ticated codewords and wants to construct a fraudulent one. An A-code provides per-
fect protection against spoofing of order t if the enemy’s best strategy is randomly
selecting one of the remaining codewords. It is straightforward to see that in the
construction given in Section 4.2, using an A-code that provides protection against
spoofing of order t ensures that probability of success in spoofing of order t (which
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can be defined similar to A-codes) is equal to (Pt):, where Pt is the probability of
success in spoofing of order t for the A-code used in the construction.
By replacing the underlying A-code with a WegmanCarter type construction
[1] one can obtain an MRA-code for multiple authentication using universal hash
functions.
5.2. MRA-Codes with Dynamic Sender
An interesting extension of the model of an MRA-code is when the sender is not
fixed and can be any member of the group. In this case key distribution is by a
trusted authority (TA) who is only active during the key distribution phase. We call
the system MRA-code with dynamic sender. There are many applications for such
systems. For example, providing authentication in group communication, where
members of a group want to broadcast messages such that every other group mem-
ber can verify the authenticity of the received messages. It is worth noting that
providing authentication in group communication is much more difficult than
providing confidentiality because, in the former group members can participate in
a coordinated attack against the other group members, while in the latter, protec-
tion is only provided against outsider’s eavesdropping.
Allowing the sender to be dynamic introduces the notion of authenticating with
respect to a particular identity. That is, to verify authenticity of a received message
a receiver must first assume an identity for the sender and then verify the message
with respect to this particular sender. An authenticated message in general carries
information that indicates its origin, together with its content information and,
hence, the system must provide origin (entity) authentication and message authen-
tication both. In other words the success of attacker(s) could be by replacing the
identity information, or the message content.
5.2.1. The model. In the model MRA-code with dynamic sender, there are n
users P=[P1 , ..., Pn], who want to communicate over a broadcast channel. The
channel is subject to spoofing attack; that is a codeword can be inserted into the
channel or, a transmitted codeword can be substituted with a fraudulent one. An
attack is directed towards a channel, consisting of a pair of users [Pi , Pj], Pi as the
sender and Pj as the receiver. A spoofer might be an outsider, or a coalition of w&1
users. The aim of the spoofer(s) is to construct a codeword that Pj accepts as being
sent from Pi . We assume that the TA is only active during key distribution phase.
The system has three phases.
1. Key distribution. The TA generates and distributes secret information to
each user.
2. Broadcast. One of the users generates an authenticated message for a
source state of hisher choice, and broadcasts it.
3. Verification. Every user can verify authenticity of the broadcasted
message using their own secret information.
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Definition 5.1. A (w, n) MRA-code with dynamic sender is a code for which
no w&1 subset of users can perform impersonation andor substitution attack on
any other pair of users.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that after the key distribution phase, each
user can only send at most a single authenticated message.
From the above definition, we make the following observations:
1. In a (w, n) MRA-code with dynamic sender during the key distribution
phase, the TA does not know which user is going to broadcast. That is, there are
n users and everyone of them could be a sender.
2. A (w, n) MRA-code with dynamic sender is a (w$, n) MRA-code with
dynamic sender for any w$w.
3. We assume that a message is sent only once by a single sender. So a
possible attack is to change the origin information of codeword and leave the
message content intact.
A straightforward construction based on conventional A-codes is to give each
pair of users, [Pi , Pj], a shared secret key. Note that now a user can generate the
authenticators for a message using the secret keys he shares with all Pjs, and broad-
cast the concatenation of them. In this case there are n(n&1)2 pairs of users,
which means that a user has to store (n&1) keys, and the TA has to generate and
store (n&1)n2 keys. The disadvantages of this scheme are the large amount of
keys stored by each user, together with the long tag for the authenticated message.
Our aim is to give more efficient constructions which reduce the key management
of both the TA and the users and reduce the authenticator size, compared to this
trivial scheme.
5.2.2. Lower bounds. To define PI and PS in an MRA-code with a dynamic
sender, we note that because every user can be a sender, when a message is received
by a user Pi , shehe must first assume an identity for the sender and then verify the
authenticity of the message with respect to the assumed identity. The enemy is a set
of w&1 malicious users, Pl1 , ..., Plw&1 , who attack a pair of other users. For example,
targeting the pair [Pi , Pj], results in Pj accepting a fraudulent message as being
sent from Pi . In the impersonation attack, Pl1 , ..., Plw&1 collude and try to launch an
attack against a pair of users Pi and Pj , by generating a message such that Pj
accepts it as authentic and being sent from Pi . We denote the success probability
in this case by PI[m; i, j; L], where L=[Pl1 , ..., Plw&1]. PI is the best probability of
success in such attacks and is defined by
PI= max
[L, i, j]
max
m
PI[m; i, j; L],
where L _ [i, j] runs through all (w+1)-subsets of [1, 2, ..., n].
In the substitution attack, there are two distinct cases.
1. Message substitution. After seeing a valid message m broadcasted by Pi ,
the users [Pl1 , ..., Plw&1] construct a new message m$ (m{m$) such that Pj will
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accept m$ as being sent from Pi . We denote the success probability in this case by
PS[m, m$; i, j; L], and the best probability of such an attack is denoted by PSmessage ,
PSmessage= max[L, i, j]
max
m${m
PS[m, m$; i, j; L],
where L _ [i, j] runs through all (w+1)-subsets of [1, 2, ..., n].
2. Entity substitution. After seeing a valid message m broadcasted by Pi , the
users [Pl1 , ..., Plw&1] construct a new message m$, not necessarily different from m$,
such that Pj will accept m$ as being sent from Pi $ , where i{i $. We denote the
success probability in this case by PS[m, m$; i, i $, j; L], and the best probability of
such an attack by
PSentity= max[L, i, i $, j]
max
m$, m
PS[m, m$; i, i $, j; L],
where L _ [i, i $, j] runs through all (w+2)-subsets of [1, 2, ..., n].
Now the probability of success in the substitution attack for the whole system is
defined as
PS=max[PSmessage , PSentity].
Theorem 5.3. In a (w, n) MRA-code with dynamic sender, assume that
PI=PS1q and assume there is a uniform probability distribution on the source
states S. Then we have:
(i) |Ei |q2w for each i # [1, 2, ..., n],
(ii) |Mi |qw |S| for each i # [1, 2, ..., n],
where Ei is the set of possible keys of Pi and Mi is the set of possible codewords when
Pi is a sender for all i # [1, 2, ..., n]. These are tight bounds and there exists a system
that satisfies them with equality.
Proof. For each i, 1in, Pi is a possible sender and so the (w, n)
MRA-system with dynamic sender induces a (w, n&1) MRA-code, in which the
probability of success in impersonation and substitution attacks are both 1q. By
applying Theorem 3.2, we obtain the required results. In Section 5.2.3 we will show
that the bounds are tight by giving a construction that meets them. K
5.2.3. An optimal construction. Now we give a construction for a (w, n)
MRA-code with dynamic sender, which is based on symmetric polynomials in
two variables. In [17] a (w, n) MRA-code with dynamic sender using Blom’s key
distribution scheme is proposed. The following construction is a slightly modified
version of the construction given in [17]. We show that the construction has the
minimum length of keys for users and the authenticator, and meets the bounds in
Theorem 5.2 with equality. We first briefly review the Blom key distribution
scheme.
Blom key distribution scheme. Let qn be a prime power. The TA randomly
chooses a symmetric polynomial, F(x, y), with coefficients in GF(q) and of degree
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less than w. For 1in, the TA computes the polynomial Gi (x)=F(x, i) and
gives Gi (x) to user Pi , i.e., Gi (x) is the secret information of Pi . The key associated
with the pair of users Pi and Pj is calculated as kij=G i ( j)=Gj (i). It is proved [2]
that the scheme is unconditionally secure against the collusion of w&1 users in the
following sense: the coalition of any w&1 out of n users, say Pi1 , ..., Piw1 , has no
information about the key kij for the pair i, j, where i, j  [i1 , ..., iw].
(w, n) MRA-code with dynamic sender based on Blom’s scheme. The (w, n)
MRA-code, with a dynamic sender based on Blom’s scheme, works as follows. Let
S be the set of source states and qmax[ |S|, n] be a prime power.
1. Key distribution. The TA chooses n distinct numbers ai in GF(q)
(associate ai to user Pi , 1in). These values are public and are used as identity
information for users. Then the TA randomly chooses two symmetric polynomials
of degree less than w with coefficients in GF(q),
Fl (x, y)=(1, x, ..., xw&1)Al \
1
y
b
yw&1+ , l=0, 1,
where Al is a w_w symmetric matrix for l=0, 1. For 1in, the TA computes
the polynomials
Gli (x)=Fl (x, ai)=(1, x, ..., xw&1)Al \
1
ai
b
aw&1i
+ , l=0, 1,
and gives the 2-tuple of polynomials, (G0i (x), G1i (x)), to user Pi . This constitutes
the secret information of Pi .
2. Broadcast. For 1in, assume that the user Pi wants to generate
the authenticated message for a source state s # S. Pi computes the polynomial
Mi (x)=G0i(x)+sG1i (x) and broadcasts (s, ai , M i (x)).
3. Verification. The user Pj can verify the authenticity of the message in
the following way. Pj accepts (s, ai , Mi (x)) as authentic and being sent from Pi if
Mi (aj)=G0j (ai)+sG1j (a i).
Theorem 5.3. The above scheme is a (w, n) MRA-code with dynamic sender with
PI=PS=1q.
Proof. Assume that after seeing an authenticated message (s, ai , Mi (x)) broad-
cast by the user Pi , the users P1 , ..., Pw&1 want to generate a new message
(s$, ai , Mi $(x)), where s${s such that the user Pj will accepts it as authentic, i.e.
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Mi $(aj)=G0j (a i)+s$G1j (a i). First, we observe that for each m # GF(q) each user,
say Pt , can calculate the polynomial
G0t (x)+mG1t (x)=(1, x, ..., xw&1)(A0+mA1) \
1
at
b
aw&1t
+ .
It follows that for each m # GF(q), P1 , ..., Pw&1 can calculate a w_(w&1) matrix
D[m] such that the following identity holds:
(A0+mA1) _
1
a1
} } }
aw&11
} } }
} } }
} } }
} } }
1
aw&1
} } }
aw&1w&1
&=D[m]. (3)
Since (s, ai , Mi (x)) is broadcast, it follows that P1 , ..., Pw&1 know the polynomial
g(x)=(1, x, } } } , xw&1)(A0+sA1) \
1
ai
b
aw&1i
+ .
By combining Eq. (3) and the polynomial g(x), P1 , ..., Pw&1 can also calculate
matrices B and C such that the following equations hold:
A0+sA1=C (4)
(A0+mA1) _
1
a1
} } }
ak&11
} } }
} } }
} } }
} } }
1
aw&1
} } }
aw&1w&1
&=D[m] for all m # GF(q). (5)
We claim that in Eqs. (4) and (5), knowing C and D[m] for all m # GF(q) cannot
determine the 2-tuple matrices (A0 , A1). In fact, there exist q distinct 2-tuple
matrices (A0 , A1) satisfying Eqs. (4) and (5). This is equivalent to the statement:
There exists 2-tuple matrices (A0 , A1){(0, 0) such that the following equations hold:
A0+sA1=0 (6)
(A0+mA1) _
1
a1
} } }
aw&11
} } }
} } }
} } }
} } }
1
aw&1
} } }
aw&1w&1
&=0 for all m # GF(q). (7)
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Indeed, consider the symmetric polynomial,
F(x, y)=(x&a1) } } } (x&aw&1)( y&a1) } } } ( y&aw&1)
=(1, x, ..., xw&1)A \
1
y
b
yw&1+ ,
where A is a w_w symmetric matrix and A{0. We define A0=&sA and A1=A;
then it is not difficult to verify that (A0 , A1) satisfies the desired properties.
We note that since (&sA, A) satisfy Eqs. (6) and (7), so does (&rsA, rA) for all
r # GF(q). This implies that there are q distinct 2-tuple symmetric polynomials
which are equally likely to be chosen by the TA. For each 2-tuple matrix (A0 , A1)
of the from (&rsA, rA), let
(1, aj , } } } , aw&1j )(A0+s$A1) \
1
a i
b
ak&1i
+=d.
Then it is straightforward to verify that d=0 if and only if r=0. This is equivalent
to saying that the q distinct possible 2-tuple polynomials (F0 (x, y), F1 (x, y))
chosen by the TA result in q distinct values of the form F0 (ai , a j)+s$F1 (ai , aj).
Therefore, the probability of message substitution attack PSmessage is 1q. Similarly, we
can prove PSentity=PI=1q. K
We see that in this construction the size of each user’s key is |Ei |=q2w for all
1in, and the size of codewords is Mi=qw+1=qw |S|. Thus, we have shown
that the bounds given in Theorem 5.1 are satisfied with the equality.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Multireceiver authentication is an important cryptographic primitive in secure
group communication. In this paper, we formally defined MRA-codes and derived
information-theoretic and combinatorial lower bounds on their performance. We
reviewed other works in this area and showed their relations to our work. We have
presented an efficient and flexible construction for MRA-codes by the combination
of a cover-free family and an A-code. This construction generalises an earlier work
by Fujii, Kachen, and Kurosawa. We also generalised Desmedt, Frankel, and Yung
(DFY) polynomial construction for multiple message transmission. Finally, we
introduced the model of multireceiver authentication code with a dynamic sender,
derived combinatorial bounds for key and message sizes of such a system, and gave
an optimal construction that meets the bounds with equality. Deriving an informa-
tion-theoretic bound for MRA systems with dynamic senders and the construction
of systems with more than one dynamic sender are interesting open problems.
Another important direction to generalise this work is to require MRA systems to
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provide secrecy against outsiders. Study of MRA systems so far has been in the con-
text of systems without secrecy. Requiring secrecy of a broadcasted message can
also be seen as adding authenticity to the known model of broadcast encryp-
tion [10]. This means that we require general multireceiver systems that reduce to
MRA-codes and broadcast encryption systems when only authenticity, or only
secrecy, is required. A successful generalisation will extend the known model of
MRA-code by imposing an access structure on the set of receivers such that only
the authorised set of receivers can verify the authenticity of messages.
APPENDIX I
Proof of Theorem 3.1. 1. We define an impersonation characteristic function /I
on M_Ei_EL by
/I (m, ei , eL)={
1, if m is a valid for e # E in C
such that {i (e)=ei and {L (e)=eL
0, otherwise.
From the definition of the impersonation attack we can express PI[i, I] as
PI[i, L]=max
m # M
P(? i (m) is valid in C i | eL # EL)
=max
m # M
:
ei # Ei
/I (m, ei , eL) P(ei | eL)).
For given L[1, ..., n] and i  L, let P(m, ei , eL) be the joint probability distribu-
tion induced by the system. If /I (m, ei , eL)=0 then P(m, e i , eL)=0. Indeed, if
P(m, ei , eL){0 then m is a valid message for e with {i (e)=ei and {L (e)=eL , which
contradicts the definition of /I (m, ei , eL):
I(M; Ei | EL)=EP(m, ei , eL)
P(M, Ei | EL)
P(M | EL) P(Ei | EL)
= :
m # M, ei # Ei , eL # EL
P(m, ei , eL) log
P(m, e i | eL)
P(m | eL) P(ei | eL)
= :
m # M, ei # Ei , eL # EL
P(m, ei , eL) log
P(ei | m, eL) P(m | eL)
P(m | eL) P(ei | eL)
= :
P(m, eL){0
m # M, eL # EL
P(m, eL) \ :ei # Ei P(ei | m, eL) log
P(ei | m, eL)
P(ei | eL) + .
For each pair (m, eL) with P(m, eL){0, if /I (m, ei , eL)=0 then P(ei | m, eL)=0. In
this case, P(ei | m, eL) log(P(ei | m, eL)P(e i | eL)=0. It follows that the summation
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taking over Ei in the above identity is restricted to all ei for which /I (m, ei , eL)=1.
Thus we have
I(M; Ei | EL)= :
P(m, eL){0
m # M, eL # EL
P(m, eL)
_\ :ei # Ei P(ei | m, eL) /I (m, ei , eL) log
P(ei | m, eL) /I (m, e i , eL)
P(ei | eL) /I (m, e i , eL) + .
By log-sum inequality we have
I(M; Ei | EL) :
P(m, eL){0
m # M, eL # EL
P(m, eL) \ :ei # Ei P(ei | m, eL) /I (m, ei , eL)+
_log
ei # Ei P(ei | m, eL) /I (m, e i , eL)
ei # Ei P(ei | eL) /I (m, ei , eL)
.
For each pair (m, eL), as we have noted before, if P(m, eL){0 and /I (m, ei , eL)=0,
then P(ei | m, eL)=0. It follows that
:
ei # Ei
P(e i | m, eL) /I (m, ei , eL)=1
and
:
ei # Ei
P(e i | eL) /I (m, ei , eL)=P(?i (m) is valid in Ci | eL).
We obtain
I(M; Ei | EL)& :
m # M, eL # EL
P(m, eL) log P(?i (m) is valid in C i | eL)
=& :
eL # EL
P(eL) :
m # M
P(m | eL) log P(?i (m) is valid in Ci | eL).
Since
PI[i, L] :
eL # EL
P(eL)[max
m # M
P(?i (m) is valid in Ci | eL)]
 :
eL # EL
P(eL) _ :m # M P(m | eL) P(?i (m) is valid in C i | eL)& ,
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by the Jensen inequality, it follows that
log PI[i, L] :
eL # EL
P(eL) :
m # M
P(m | eL) log P(? i (m) is valid in Ci | eL)
&I(M; Ei | EL).
Therefore, PI[i, L]2&I(M; Ei | EL).
2. In the substitution attack RL receives their keys from the sender; observe a
message m that is transmitted by T and substitutes another message m$ for m. RL
succeed if m$ is accepted by Ri as authentic. We denote by PS[i, L] the successful
probability that RL perform a substitution attack on R i . We have
PS[i, L]= max
eL # EL
max
m # M
max
m${m # M
P(? i (m) is valid in C i | m, eL).
Now we define a substitution characteristic function /S(m$, m, ei , eL) by
/S(m$, m, ei , eL)={1, /I (m$, ei , eL)=1; /I (m, ei , eL)=1, m${m,0, otherwise.
We introduce a random variable M$ which only takes values when
/S (m$, m, ei , eL)=1. It follows that there is a joint probability distribution
P(m$, m, ei , eL) such that P(m, e i , eL) is the probability distribution given in the
system and such that if /S (m$, m, ei , eL)=0 and P(m, ei , eL){0 then
P(m$, ei , eL)=0.
I(M$; Ei | M, EL)=EP(m$, m, ei , eL) log
P(M$, Ei | M, EL)
P(M$ | M, EL) P(Ei | M, EL)
= :
ei # Ei , eL # EL
m$ # M$, m # M
P(m$, m, ei , eL) log
P(m$, ei | m, eL)
P(m$ | m, eL) P(ei | m, eL)
= :
ei # Ei , eL # EL
m$ # M$, m # M
P(m$, m, eL) P(ei | m$, m, eL)
_log
P(m$ | m, eL) P(ei | m$, m, eL)
P(m$ | m, eL) P(ei | m, eL)
= :
eL # EL , P(m, m, eL){0
m$ # M$, m # M
P(m$, m, eL) :
ei # Ei
P(ei | m$, m, eL)
_log
P(m$ | m, eL) P(ei | m$, m, eL)
P(m$ | m, eL) P(ei | m, eL)
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If P(m$, m, eL){0 then /S (m$, m, ei , eL)=0 implies P(ei | m$, m, eL)=0, and so
P(ei | m$, m, ei , eL) log
P(ei | m$, m, eL)
P(ei | m, eL)
=0.
Thus the summation taking over Ei in the above identity is restricted to all ei for
which /S (m$, m, ei , eL)=1. By log-sum inequality, we have
I(M$; Ei | M, EL)= :
eL # EL , P(m$, m, eL){0
m$ # M, m # M
P(m$, m, eL)
_ :
ei # Ei
P(ei | m$, m, eL) /S (m$, m, ei , eL)
_\log P(ei | m$, m, eL) /S (m$, m, ei , eL)P(ei | m, eL) /S (m$, m, ei , eL) +
 :
eL # EL , P(m$, m, eL){0
m$ # M, m # M
P(m$, m, eL)
_ :
ei # Ei
P(ei | m$, m, eL) /S (m$, m, ei , eL)
_\log
ei # Ei P(ei | m$, m, eL) /S (m$, m, ei , eL)
ei # Ei P(ei | m, eL) /S (m$, m, ei , eL) +
Again, if P(m$, m, eL){0 and /S (m$, m, ei , eL)=0 then P(ei | m$, m, eL)=0. It
follows that
:
ei # Ei
P(ei | m$, m, eL) /S (m$, m, ei , eL)=1
and
:
ei # Ei
P(e i | m, eL) /S (m$, m, ei , eL)=P(? i(m’) is valid in Ci | m, eL).
So we have
I(M$; Ei | M, EL)& :
m$ # M$, m # M, eL # EL
P(m$, m, eL)
_log P(?i(m$) is valid in Ci | m, eL)
=& :
m # M, eL # EL
P(m, eL)
_ :
m$ # M$
P(m$ | eL , m) log P(?i (m$) is valid in Ci | m, eL).
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Since
PS[i, L] :
eL # EL
P(eL) :
m # M
P(m | eL)
_ :
m$ # M$
P(m$ | m, eL) P(?i (m$) is valid in Ci | m, eL)
 :
eL # EL , m # M
P(eL , m)
_ :
m$ # M$
P(m$ | m, eL) P(?i (m$) is valid in Ci | m, eL).
By Jensen’s inequality, it follows that
log PS[i, L] :
eL , m # M
P(eL , m) :
m$ # M$
P(m$ | m, eL)
_log P(?i(m$)is valid in Ci | M, eL)
&I(M$; Ei | M, EL).
We obtain
PS[i, L]2&I(M$; Ei | M, EL).
APPENDIX II
In the following we give a comparison between bounds obtained in Theorem 3.2
and the bounds derived by Kurosawa and Obana in [13]. Let l=|M|  |S| .
1. In [13] the first part of Theorem 9 proves that
PI
1
w- l
.
We show that our Theorem 3.2(iii) implies that
PD=max[PI , PS]
1
w- l
.
This is because, assuming PD=max[PI , PS]=1q and using Theorem 3.2(iii), we
have
|M|qw |S| O PD=
1
q
 |S||M | =
1
w- l
.
Our result applies to general MRA-codes. KO’s result is stronger as PS1q
implies PD1q, but it only applies to MRA-codes that are perfect for impersonation.
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2. Theorems 10 and 11 in [13] in fact prove the following result (see also the
introduction in [13]).
Theorem 1 (KO [13]). For (w, n) a MRA-code without secrecy, if PI=
PS=1 w- l, then |E|l2 and |Ei |( w- l)2 for all 1in.
This result can be also obtained from Theorem 3.2. Indeed, since PI=
PS=1 w- l , we have PD=1 w- l=1q, where q= w- l. By our Theorem 3.3(i) and
(ii) it follows that
|Eiq2=( w- l)2,
|E|q2w=( w- l)2w=(l)2,
proving the desired result.
This result applies to all (w, n) MRA-codes and does not require the code to be
perfect for impersonation, or the assumption that the code is without secrecy.
3. The second parts of Theorems 9, 10, and 11 in [13] do not have any coun-
terpart in this paper.
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